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NUNO GAROUPA & JUD MATHEWS*

Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference:
Explaining the Comparative Law
of Administrative Reviewt
This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in
administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to
agencies, agencies' exercise of discretion,and judicialpractices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we
show how cross-nationaldifferences in institutions' capacitiesand the
environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies
that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibriumoutcomes. We apply our model to explain patterns of administrativelaw in the United
States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this Article, we develop a general model to explain cross-national variation in administrative law regimes. We focus on
explaining three features in particular: legislative practices of delegation to agencies, the exercise of discretion by agencies, and the
application of deference by reviewing courts to agency actions. We
show how these features of an administrative system are linked to
one another in ways shaped by the background features of the legal
and political system.
The emerging field of comparative administrative law has highlighted significant cross-national differences in administrative law
processes and institutions, including the different roles played by
courts. 1 Of course, administrative law is just one of the many dimensions along which national legal and political systems vary, with
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1. For a recent and concise overview of the field, see Francesca Bignami, Comparative Administrative Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 145
(Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). See generally COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATiVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).

